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Guidelines for the Reform of Immigration
Policy*
BARRY R. CHISWICK**
In proposing optimal immigration criteria for the United
States, the author focuses on the economic consequences of im-
migration, including the labor-market productivity of immi-
grants and their impact on the native population. Current im-
migration policy, according to the author, emphasizes kinship
with a United States citizen or resident alien as the criterion
for rationing immigration visas, largely ignoring the skills or
likely labor-market adjustment of the visa applicant. More-
over, the enforcement of immigration law appears to be mini-
mal and has declined in both real resources and effectiveness in
recent years. The result of limited enforcement and the empha-
sis on kinship is the arrival of a relatively large proportion of
low-skilled immigrants.
The author proposes a skill-based rationing system for
visas as an alternative to current policy. Under this proposal,
the applicant's level of skill would be the primary determinant
in deciding whether to issue a visa. Except for the immediate
relatives of United States citizens, kinship would play a minor
role. This policy, combined with more stringent enforcement of
immigration law, would raise the skill level and favorable eco-
nomic impact of immigrants. In contrast, the recommendations
of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy
(SCIRP) would favor low-skilled immigrants. Also, the SCIRP
proposals would shift the burden of enforcing immigration law
from the appropriate government authorities to employers, who
would be forced to screen all workers regarding their immigra-
tion status.
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I. INTRODUCTION
United States immigration policy may have a substantial long-
term impact on the economic well-being of the country as a whole,
and on its various demographic groups. It is, however, an issue on
which there is much public confusion, primarily because people ap-
proach immigration policy in an emotional rather than a rational
manner.
This article provides a framework for the analysis of immigra-
tion policy-the policy of granting permanent resident-alien sta-
tus.' The framework focuses on both the overall economic impacts
of immigration and the distribution of these impacts. This ap-
proach evaluates the economic costs and benefits of alternative im-
migration policies.
Immigration policy includes the laws and regulations regard-
ing who may enter the United States. It also addresses for what
period of time and for what purposes (i.e., work, study or travel)
people may immigrate. The enforcement of immigration laws and
regulations is equally important. A policy of stringent criteria for
entry combined with lax enforcement is a policy of relatively easy
entry for persons willing to violate the law.
As with most other social regulations, the original intent of
immigration restrictions was to protect the health and safety of the
resident population.' Restrictions created in the nineteenth cen-
tury were intended to bar criminals, indigents, persons with conta-
gious diseases, and other social misfits. Quantitative restrictions
were then introduced, first against East Asians, and then against
eastern and southern Europeans, partly because of racial and reli-
1. This article deals with permanent resident aliens or immigrants, and not foreign stu-
dents, visitors, or temporary workers.
2. For a brief review of the history of United States immigration law and trends, see
Chiswick, Immigrants and Immigration Policy, in CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 285-
325 (W. Fellner ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Chiswick, Immigration Policy]. The major
legislative development since 1978 is the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat.
102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
[Vol. 36:893
REFORM OF IMMIGRATION POLICY
gious prejudice and xenophobia, and partly to protect the wages of
low-skilled native workers from the competition of unskilled immi-
grants.3 The 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA)4 eliminated most of the racism and ethnocentrism im-
plicit in U.S. immigration policy.5 These amendments, and the
1978 amendments pertaining to the Western Hemisphere,' substi-
tuted kinship with a U.S. citizen or a resident alien for country of
origin as the primary criterion for obtaining immigration visas.
Immigration policy has widespread economic implications be-
cause of its direct and indirect impact on the labor market. The
current kinship-based policy, although superficially appealing on
humanitarian grounds, has generated substantial dissatisfaction.
Adopting this policy in 1965, at a time of seemingly unlimited
prosperity, may have been essential for eliminating the pernicious
quota system based on national origins. But in the current era of
slower increases in productivity, it is even more appropriate to ask
who bears the burden of immigration policy, and whether alterna-
tive and equally nonracist policies could have a more favorable
economic impact.
In formulating immigration policy, the effect of immigrants on
the U.S. labor market, and consequently on the income and em-
ployment of the native population, is an important consideration.
Because immigrants vary widely in their employment skills, their
impact is not unidimensional. Even if all immigrants shared the
same skills, their impact on the native population would not be
uniform because of the heterogeneity of the native population. In-
sights into the productivity of immigrants add a new dimension to
the policy debate. They suggest that it is not only the number of
immigrants that is relevant, but also the characteristics of those
immigrants. The characteristics of an annual stream of immigrants
are not exogenous; they largely can be determined by immigration
policy.
Two alternatives to current policy will be discussed in this ar-
ticle. One is a skill-based rationing system in which productivity
characteristics are the primary criteria for rationing visas. The
other is the set of recommendations from the Select Commission
3. Chiswick, Immigration Policy, supra note 2, at 292.
4. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, §§ 8, 24, 79 Stat. 916, 922 (1965) (current
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. V 1981)).
5. See infra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
6. Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, 92 Stat. 907.
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on Immigration and Refugee Policy,' which would increase the role
of kinship in issuing immigration visas and granting amnesty to
illegal aliens. This article concludes that a skill-based rationing
system better satisfies the objectives of promoting economic
growth and reducing the relative size of income transfers in the
economy.
II. CURRENT IMMIGRATION: POLICY AND FLOWS
Current immigration law has its basis in the 1965 amendments
to the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act.' The 1965 amend-
ments abolished the discredited national-origins quota system in-
stituted in the 1920's, as well as the emphasis on skill or productiv-
ity introduced in 1952 for rationing visas." In their place, the
amendments created a "preferences" rationing system that heavily
emphasized kinship with a U.S. citizen or resident alien.10 Skill
7. See infra text accompanying notes 61, 70-88.
S. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, §§ 8, 24, 79 Stat. 916, 922 (1965) (current
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. V 1981)). The 1952 Act primarily was a recodification of
existing law.
9. See Chiswick, Immigration Policy, supra note 2, at 293-98.
10. The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203, 94 Stat. 102, 107 (codified as
amended in 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp. V 1981)), which further amended the Immigration and
Nationality Act, revised the refugee admission procedures. See infra text accompanying
notes 33-37. The current system of the "preferences" rationing system provides,
Allocation of immigrant visas
(a) Categories of preference priorities; per centum limitations; waiting lists
(1) Visas shall be first made available, in a number not to exceed 20 per
centum of the number specified in section 1151(a) of this title, to qualified immi-
grants who are the unmarried sons or daughters of citizens of the United States.
(2) Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to exceed 26 per
centum of the number specified in section 1151(a) of this title, plus any visas not
required for the classes specified in paragraph (1) of this subsection, to qualified
immigrants who are the spouses, unmarried sons or unmarried daughters of an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
(3) Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to exceed 10 per
centum of the number specified in section 1151(a) of this title, to qualified immi-
grants who are members of the professions, or who because of their exceptional
ability in the sciences or the arts will substantially benefit prospectively the na-
tional economy, cultural interest, or welfare of the United States, and whose
services in the professions, sciences, or arts are sought by an employer in the
United States.
(4) Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to exceed 10 per
centum of the number specified in section 1151(a) of this title, plus any visas not
required for the classes specified in paragraphs (1) through (3) of this subsec-
tion, to qualified immigrants who are the married sons or the married daughters
of citizens of the United States.
(5) Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to exceed 24 per
[Vol. 36:893
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and refugee status were given relatively minor roles.
The basic features of current immigration law, including the
changes introduced by the Refugee Act of 1980,11 are outlined in
Table 1. The number of immigrants "admitted" to the United
States under various categories is shown for two years in Table 2.12
The worldwide, country, and preference category quotas indicated
in Table 1 refer to ceilings on the number of visas issued per year.
The data on immigration refer to the number of persons entering
the United States with an immigrant visa, or receiving a change in
status to permanent resident alien. Immigrant visas need not be
used in the fiscal year they are issued. Some are never used.
A person may receive immigrant status (permanent resident
alien status) under one of three general categories: (1) as an imme-
diate relative of a U.S. citizen; (2) by other kinship criteria, or (3)
by occupation (skill).' s Also, the Attorney General may grant refu-
centum of the number specified in section 1151(a) of this title, plus any visas not
required for the classes specified in paragraphs (1) through (4) of this subsec-
tion, to qualified immigrants who are the brothers or sisters of citizens of the
United States, provided such citizens are at least twenty-one years of age.
(6) Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to exceed 10 per
centum of the number specified in section 1151(a) of this title, to qualified immi-
grants who are capable of performing specified skilled or unskilled labor, not of a
temporary or seasonal nature, for which a shortage of employable and willing
persons exists in the United States.
(7) Visas authorized in any fiscal year, less those required for issuance to the
classes specified in paragraphs (1) through (6), shall be made available to other
qualified immigrants strictly in the chronological order in which they qualify
(8) A (minor) spouse or child. . . shall, if not otherwise entitled to an immi-
grant status and the immediate issuance of a visa under paragraphs (1) through
(7) of this subsection, be entitled to the same status . . . if accompanying, or
following to join, his spouse or parent.
8 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp. V 1981).
11. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
12. Of the 601,000 immigrants "admitted" in 1978, 230,000 were already in the United
States and received an "adjustment of status." Of these, 122,000 were Cuban and In-
dochinese refugees (28,000 and 94,000 respectively) whose adjustment of status outside the
numerical limitations was made possible by legislation in 1976 and 1977. Of the 101,000
adjustments made under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the official
status at entry of nearly 60% was "temporary visitors for pleasure." Another 18% were
students. An immigration visa often is easier to obtain from inside the United States than
from outside. U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 1978 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 5-6,
10-11 [hereinafter cited as 1978 INS YEARBOOK].
13. "Private bills" are enacted in a small number of cases (138 in the 95th Congress) to
grant immigrant status to individuals who otherwise would not qualify. The Federal Bureau
of Investigation used bogus bribes to congressmen for introducing private immigration bills
in its ABSCAM investigation of congressional corruption.
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gees asylum or parole status.1 ' This enables them to enter and
work in the United States indefinitely, although most eventually
obtain an adjustment of status and become permanent resident
aliens.15 Obtaining permanent resident alien status is the first step
toward acquiring U.S. citizenship.
14. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (Supp. V 1981).
15. Id. For example, in 1978, 122,000 Cuban and Indochinese refugees became perma-
nent resident aliens outside of the preference and quota system under legislation enacted in
1976 and 1977. 1978 INS YEARBOOK, supra note 12, at 10.
[Vol. 36:893
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF THE IMMIGRATION PREFERENCE SYSTEM
UNDER THE 1965 AND SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS
TO THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT
1. Immigrants Not Subject to Numerical Limitation
Spouse and minor children of U.S. citizens and the parents of U.S. citizens over age 21
























Spouse and unmarried children of
permanent resident aliens
Professionals, and scientists and
artists of exceptional ability
whose services are sought by a
U.S. employer
Married children of U.S. citizens
Siblings of U.S. citizens provided
that such citizens are at least 21
years of age
Workers in occupations for which
labor is scarce in the U.S.
Any applicant not entitled to a
preference
Spouse and minor children of a
preference applicant can be classi-
fied with the same preference if a







26 percent plus any not required
for first preference
10 percent
10 percent plus any not required
for first three preferences
24 percent plus any not required
for first four preferences
10 percent
Amount that is not required for
preference applicants
Charged to appropriate preference
aThe hemisphere quotas were converted to a combined world ceiling of 290,000 visas by the
1978 amendments and reduced to 270,000 visas per year when the Refugee Act of 1980
removed refugees from the preference system.
bCountry ceiling applicable to the Eastern Hemisphere under the 1965 amendments and the
Western Hemisphere since the 1977 amendments.
Cpreference system applicable to the Eastern Hemisphere under the 1965 amendments and
the Western Hemisphere under the 1977 amendments. Prior to 1977, Western Hemisphere
visas issued on a first-come, first-served basis.
dlncreased from 20% with the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980. The six percent previ-
ously was allocated to a "refugee preference." This preference was dropped with the passage
of the Refugee Act of 1980, which established a quota of 50,000 visas for refugees outside of
the preference system, and gave the President authority to admit additional refugees. The
Act changed the definition of "refugee" to a person with a well-founded fear of religious,
political, or racial persecution regardless of country of origin, whereas refugee status was
previously applicable only to persons fleeing a communist country or the general area of the
Middle East.
SOURCE: Immigration and Naturalization Service.
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TABLE 2
IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES
FISCAL YEARS 1975 AND 1978
Immigrant Category 1975 1978
Total Immigrants 386,194 601,442
Immigrants exempt from numerical limitation 104,633 260,333
Immediate relatives 91,504 125,819
Immigrants Act of -- 122,441
October 12, 1976, and
October 30, 1977 a
Other 13,129 12,077
Immigrants subject to limitationb 160,460 165,743
Eastern Hemisphere 160,460 165,743
Relative preferences 95,945 123,501
First preference 871 1,120
Second preference 43,077 44,116
Fourth preference 3,623 5,954
Fifth preference 48,374 72,311
Occupational preferences 29,334 26,295
Third preference (professionals) 8,363 4,822
Sixth preference (other workers) 16,724 17,705
Their spouses and children 14,247 13,768
Refugees-seventh preference 9,129 9,724
Nonpreference, private bills, 26,052 6,223
and others
Western Hemisphere 121,101 175,361
Relative preferences -- 66,796
First preference -- 2,572
Second preference -- 33,631
Fourth preference -- 5,450
Fifth preference -- 25,143
Occupational preferences
Third preference (professionals) -- 465
Sixth preference (other workers) -- 1,183
Their spouses and children -- 2,934
Refugees-seventh preference -- 585
Nonpreference, private bills, and others -- 47,987
Natives of Western Hemisphere and Immigrants Act of 1966c 121,101 55,411
NOTE: Dashes indicate category is not applicable.
aThese acts provide for Cuban and Indochinese refugees adjusting to resident alien status in
the United States.
bExcept for the occupational preferences, spouses and minor children are included in the
totals for the preference category of the immigrants.
cRefers to immigrants who obtained visas prior to the extension of the preference system to
the Western Hemisphere.
SOURCE: U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 1978 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1, 6.
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A. Kinship Criteria
The immediate relatives of United States citizens, i.e., the
spouse, unmarried minor children, and parents of adult citizens,
may enter the United States without numerical limitations.' Al-
though the number of persons entering the United States in this
manner had fluctuated around 100,000 per year since 1965, re-
cently it has increased to about 125,000 per year because of the
increased immigration of spouses and parents of citizens."
Among the visas subject to numerical limitation, at least sev-
enty-four percent (prior to the 1980 Refugee Act) were reserved for
relatives of U.S. citizens and resident aliens.' 8 In 1978, of the
165,743 immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere subject to nu-
merical limitation, seventy-five percent entered under the kinship
.preferences, as reflected in Table 2. Little use was made of the first
preference (unmarried adult children of U.S. citizens and their
children) or the fourth preference (married children of U.S. citi-
zens and their spouses and children). To the extent that these
preferences were undersubscribed, additional persons entered
under the second preference (spouses and unmarried children of
resident aliens and their children) and fifth preference (siblings of
adult U.S. citizens and their spouses and children). During the
1960's and early 1970's, the kinship preferences were not sub-
scribed fully, and "nonpreference" visa applicants were allowed to
immigrate. The rapid increase in the use of the fifth preference,
however, has eliminated this alternative. 9
For the Western Hemisphere, until 1977, visas were issued on
a first-come, first-served basis. As of 1978, new visas were issued
16. The statute provides,
The "immediate relatives" . . . shall mean the children, spouses, and par-
ents of a citizen of the United States: Provided, That in the case of parents, such
citizen must be at least twenty-one years of age. The immediate relatives speci-
fied in this subsection who are otherwise qualified for admission as immigrants
shall be admitted as such, without regard to the numerical limitations in this
chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1976).
17. 1978 INS YEARBOOK, supra note 12, at 5-6.
18. See Table 1, supra p. 899. The six percent quota for refugees was shifted to the
second preference (a kinship preference) when the Refugee Act of 1980 removed refugees
from the preference system. Refugee Act of 1980 §§ 201, 203, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 1157 (Supp.
V 1981); see infra text accompanying notes 33-37.
19. "Nonpreference" applicants must obtain a labor certificate (demonstrating they
have a "needed" skill and a job waiting for them), invest money in a business in the United
States, or satisfy some other criterion to demonstrate their economic value to the United
States.
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under the preference system. In 1978 more than 55,000 Western
Hemisphere immigrants entered with first-come, first-served visas.
Of the nearly 120,000 immigrants who entered in that year with
preference system visas, fifty-six percent immigrated under the
kinship preferences. Of these, immigration under the first and
fourth preferences was small, in contrast to immigration under the
second and fifth preferences.20
B. Occupational Criteria
The 1965 amendments reserved up to twenty percent of the
visas in the preference system for rationing on the basis of occupa-
tion. The third preference provides for the immigration of profes-
21sionals and persons of exceptional ability in the arts and sciences.
The sixth preference provides for the immigration of skilled work-
ers whose services are needed in occupations for which U.S. work-
ers are in short supply.2 2 In either situation, the immigrant and the
U.S. employer are required to complete a cumbersome application
administered by the Department of Labor's Office of Labor Certifi-
cation.28 In general, the employer must demonstrate that appropri-
ate workers are not available in the United States at the prevailing
wage for that job.2
The Office of Labor Certification has predetermined that a
shortage of workers exists for some jobs.25 These jobs, referred to
as Schedule A jobs, include: (1) physicians in a geographic area
that the Department of Health and Human Services has deter-
mined to have a shortage of practitioners in the physician's partic-
ular specialty; (2) nurses who are already registered in the state of
intended residence or who have passed the examination adminis-
tered by the Commission on Graduates of Foreign Nursing
Schools; (3) physical therapists qualified to take the state licensing
exam; (4) persons in the sciences and nonperforming arts with ex-
ceptional ability, including college teachers; (5) religious practi-
20. The very large proportion of immigrants in the nonpreference category in 1978 was
a transitional phenomenon; the preference system was introduced too recently for the kin-
ship categories to be filled.
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3) (1976); see supra note 10.
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(6) (1976); see supra note 10.
23. For the current regulations, see Labor Certification Process for Permanent Employ-
ment of Aliens in the United States, 20 C.F.R. § 656 (1982).
24. Id. §§ 656.20-.32. This requirement is meaningless because for a sufficiently high
wage-a new prevailing wage-fewer workers would be demanded and more workers already
in the United States would be available to the occupation or employer.
25. 20 C.F.R. § 656.10 (1982).
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tioners; and (6) managers in multinational corporations.2"
The Labor Certification Office has "determined" that other
occupations are not to be used as a basis for labor certification,
although labor certifications are given on occasion to applicants in
these occupations." These "Schedule B" occupations include many
that provide employment for immigrants who enter the United
States under other criteria, including personal service attendants,
cleaning staff, kitchen workers,. laborers, nurses' aides, taxicab
drivers, and gardeners.28
Although up to twenty percent of the visas subject to the pref-
erence system are reserved for occupational preferences, the sys-
tem's impact on the skill distribution of immigrants is smaller than
might appear. First, the spouse and minor unmarried children of
workers receiving an occupational preference visa generally are
charged to that preference.2 Of the 26,295 persons from the East-
ern Hemisphere who entered under an occupational preference in
1978, fifty-two percent were spouses and children, many of whom
subsequently will enter the labor force. 0 Of the 4,582 persons from
the Western Hemisphere, sixty-four percent were spouses and chil-
dren." Second, when a worker obtains a visa through a labor certi-
fication, he is not legally obligated to work for the employer or in
the occupation. The extent of this "leakage" is not known. Third,
there is a tendency for the occupational preferences to be used by
persons who are already in the United States with nonimmigrant
visas, and who are seeking an adjustment of their status. Of the
14,175 occupational-preference visas in 1978, sixty-five percent re-
ceived an adjustment of status.3 2 That is, foreigners were in the
United States under a student, tourist, or other visa, or were in the
United States illegally, but were able to obtain a labor certifica-
tion. Finally, the cumbersome certification process, which generally
requires considerable employer cooperation, gives a decided advan-
tage to persons who already are working in the United States.
In spite of these limitations on the size and scope of the num-
26. Id. Physicians and nurses, who were removed from the Schedule A list in 1976,
rejoined the list in 1980. Dieticians were removed from the list in 1980, apparently because
the national association asserted that there was no shortage. There is apparently no research
basis for the Office of Labor Certification's determinations.
27. 20 C.F.R. §§ 656.11, .23 (1982).
28. Id.
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(8) (Supp. V 1981); see supra note 10.
30. 1978 INS YEARBOOK, supra note 12, at 18-23.
31. Id. at 15.
32. Id.
19821
904 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:893
ber of immigrants who may enter under the occupational prefer-
ences, the preferences are an important source of professional
workers in the immigration stream. Among immigrants in 1978
who reported a profession on their visa application, nearly one-
fifth of the professionals were beneficiaries of an occupational pref-
erence. As shown in Table 3, of the engineers, nurses, physicians,
research workers, scientists, and college and university teachers
who immigrated, more than one-quarter did so under an occupa-
tional preference. As would be expected, only a very small propor-
tion of immigrants in other occupations received an occupational
preference, with the notable exception of cooks.
REFORM OF IMMIGRATION POLICY
TABLE 3
BENEFICIARIES OF OCCUPATIONAL PREFERENCES
BY IMMIGRANT STATUS AND OCCUPATION, FIscAL YEAR 1978
THIRD PREFERENCE SIXTH PREFERENCE
ADJUST- ADJUST-
ADMIS- MENTS OF ADMIS- MENTS OF PERCENT-























































21 369 8 179 577 43.4
108 237 45 144 534 29.5
47 195 47 180 469 25.3
43 99 112 211 465 9.4
3 466 1,285 1,764
0 145 299 446






0 119 139 258 0.5
0 51 61 112 0.5











NOTE: All detailed occupations with 450 or more beneficiaries of an occupational preference
are listed separately.
aPercentage of total number of immigrants reporting that occupation.
bPercentage of immigrants reporting a labor-market occupation. The figure is 2.4% if ex-
pressed as a percentage of all immigrants, including housewives, youths, students, the aged,
and others.
SOURCE: U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 1978 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 18-23.
19821
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
In summary, there are many features of the current occupa-
tional preferences that substantially reduce the program's ability
to facilitate the immigration of high-productivity workers. But the
preferences are an important source of high-level manpower. That
there are queues for obtaining an occupational-preference visa sug-
gests that even more high-productivity workers would immigrate if
the preference quotas were increased, country ceilings on these cat-
egories were removed, and the requirements of both prearranged
employment and the burdensome application procedure were
eased.
C. Refugees
The 1965 amendments to the INA" and the 1980 Refugee
Act 34 have attempted to regularize the flow of refugees. But events
have shown this to be difficult. The 1965 amendments allocated six
percent of the visas within the preference system to refugees, and
did not change the requirement that a refugee must be fleeing
from either a communist country or the Middle East." The 1980
Refugee Act increased the annual quota of refugees from 17,400 to
50,000 visas.8" The Act defined a refugee as any person with a well-
founded fear of political, religious, ethnic, or racial persecution
(whether from a communist country or otherwise), and who was
already in a country of first asylum.
3 7
The 1980 Refugee Act was based on the desire to be even-
handed in the treatment of persons fleeing communist and
noncommunist government persecution; it was also based on the
experiences of the Vietnamese boat people. The Act can be criti-
cized for inadequately defining refugee. Moreover, the first asylum
provision penalizes refugees from countries in close proximity to
the United States. For example, Haitians seeking asylum in Flor-
ida claimed they were refugees from poverty and, having fled,
could not return without being persecuted by an authoritarian re-
gime. The Cuban boat people-the more than 120,000 persons who
33. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 916 (current version codified in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
34. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (current version codified in scattered sec-
tions of 8 U.S.C.).
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7)(1976) (amended 1980); see supra note 18.
36. Refugee Act of 1980 § 201 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a) (Supp. V 1981)); see supra
note 4. The President may admit additional refugees if the situation requires. 8 U.S.C. §
1157(b) (Supp. V 1981).
37. Refugee Act of 1980 § 201(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (Supp. V 1981)).
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entered the United States in 1980-technically were not eligible
for admission under the Refugee Act because the United States
was the country of first asylum. Although the Cubans were admit-
ted under the Attorney General's ad hoc authority to parole per-
sons into the United States, the status of the Haitians remains
uncertain.
D. Illegal Immigration and Enforcement Resources
The enforcement of immigration law is minimal, in terms of
both the magnitude of the resources and the deterrent effect of the
deployment of these resources. The limited, but not negligible, en-
forcement of immigration law tends to attract low-skilled illegal
aliens.'
The number of immigration law violations is, of course, un-
known."8 The number of illegal immigrants in the United States
has been estimated at between two and twelve million persons, but
a recent view of these estimates by three statisticians at the Bu-
reau of the Census suggests a range of 3.5 million to 6 million per-
sons, of whom about half are Mexican nationals."' Data exist, how-
ever, on the number of apprehensions of illegal aliens. Table 4
illustrates that the number of deportable aliens located increased
from 70,000 in 1960 to more than 1,000,000 per year since 1977.0
Of the more than one million deportable aliens located in fiscal
year 1978, nearly 950,000 were Mexican nationals who entered
without inspection, as summarized in Table 5. About 28,000 Mexi-
can nationals entered the United States under other statuses, and
slightly more than 81,000 were persons of other nationalities.
38. A person may become an illegal alien by violating the condition of a legally ob-
tained visa (such as unauthorized employment under a student or visitor visa, or remaining
in the United States beyond the date specified in the visa), entering the United States with
a fraudulent visa, or making a surreptitious entry.
39. See J. Siegel, J. Passel & J. Robinson, Preliminary Review of Existing Studies of
the Number of Illegal Residents in the United States, in SzLECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION &
REFUGEE POLICY, 97TH CONG., 1ST SEss., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTER-
EST app. e (Comm. Print 1981).
40. The decline in apprehensions in fiscal year 1980, see Table 4, supra p. 908, has been
attributed to the three-month moratorium on interior enforcement, which was intended to
increase compliance with the 1980 Census, and to the diversion of Immigration and Natural-
ization Service (INS) resources for the registration of Iranian students and the Cuban boat
people. There are no data on the extent to which the same individual is apprehended more
than once in a year.
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TABLE 4
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE PERSONNEL,
IMMIGRANTS, NONIMMIGRANTS, AND DEPORTABLE ALIENS LOCATED,
FISCAL YEARS 1960-1980
INS Personnel Workload
Average Total Non- Deportable
Permanent paid compensable immigrants aliens
Year positions employmenta work yearsa,b Immigrants admitted located
1960 6,895 6,522 --- 265,398 1,140,736 70,684
1965 7,043 6,747 --- 296,697 2,075,967 110,371
1970 6,920 6,672 --- 373,326 4,431,880 345,353
1975 8,020 7,992 --- 386,194 7,083,937 766,600
1976 8,832 --- 9,227 398,615 7,654,419 875,915
1977 9,473 --- 9,705 462,315 8,036,916 1,042,215
1978 10,071 --- 9,804 601,442 9,343,710 1,057,977
1979 10,997 --- 11,655 460,348 --- 1,076,418
1980 10,943 --- 9,885 ... --- 910,361
NOTE: Since 1977, the fiscal year runs from October 1 to September 30; prior to 1977, it was from July 1
to June 30. Dashes under INS Personnel indicate data not included in the source. Dashes under Work-
load indicate data not available.
aThe data include the full-time equivalent of nonpermanent positions.
blncludes the full-time equivalent of overtime and holiday hours worked. This accounted for the
equivalent of 1,484 compensable work years in 1979 and 1,771 compensable work years in 1980.
SOURCE: U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 1978 STATIsTICAL YEARBOOK 62.
TABLE 5
DEPORTABLE ALIENS LOCATED BY STATUS AT ENTRY AND NATIONALITY,
FISCAL YEAR 1978
Nationality Status at Entry
EWI Visitor Student Crewman Other Total
Europe 295 5,521 585 6,317 1,263 13,981
Asia 138 5,008 2,969 4,940 1,720 14,775
North America 968,219 33,498 944 828 9,234 1,012,719
Mexico 948,891 21,484 349 40 5,903 976,667
South America 2,708 5,557 655 919 962 10,801
Africa 28 998 1,135 507 242 2,910
Other 68 1,699 525 281 218 2,791
Total 971,456 52,281 6,813 13,788 13,639 1,057,997
NOTE: EWI = entry without inspection.
SOURCE: U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 1978 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 72.
The increase in apprehensions reflects a large increase in ille-
gal immigration, which has been caused by five factors: (1) the end
of the bracero program for temporary farm workers in 1964, (2) the
introduction of numerical limits on Western Hemisphere immigra-
tion in 1965, (3) the prospect of amnesty as proposed by the Carter
administration in early 1977, (4) improved transportation and in-
formation networks, and (5) increased competition for jobs among
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low-skilled workers in the major sending countries.
The data on apprehensions reflect, in part, administrative de-
cisions on the allocation of enforcement resources. These decisions,
however, do not necessarily achieve their desired result. For exam-
ple, although more apprehensions per dollar of enforcement expen-
diture occur if there is a relative concentration along the Mexican
border, this may not be the maximum deterrent for a given en-
forcement budget. Apprehensions along the border may have a
minimal deterrent effect if, as many believe, most illegal aliens who
are apprehended and deported while entering without inspection
simply try again a few nights later. Apprehension and deportation
may have a greater long-term deterrent effect if they occur after an
illegal alien has penetrated the border and incurred costs in locat-
ing a job and residence. Even though the cost per apprehension
away from the border is higher, it is not necessarily less cost-effec-
tive in deterring illegal immigration.'1 The large and increasing
number of apprehensions along the Mexican border suggests that
the border is porous and that the cost of being apprehended is low
for the illegal alien. If the probability and cost of apprehension
were high, few persons would attempt illegal entry, and the num-
ber of apprehensions would be small.
Little is known about the characteristics of illegal aliens.
There are reasons to believe, however, that they are not a random
sample of persons desirous of, but unable to obtain, a legal immi-
grant visa. Rather, they are disproportionately low-skilled workers.
There is a probability greater than zero that these immigrants will
be apprehended at the border or in the interior. The probability of
detection in the interior is greater for those who come into contact
with the authorities-e.g., the police, an occupational licensing
board, or the personnel department of a government agency or
large firm. Persons with high levels of skill, particularly profession-
als who require a certification of some sort, are likely to be de-
tected. In addition, the cost of deportation is greater for immi-
grants with higher levels of skill. If deported, unskilled workers
41. David North estimated that in 1979, border enforcement, interior enforcement, and
antismuggling activities by the border patrol cost $108 per apprehension, while interior en-
forcement by the investigations unit cost $156 per apprehension. The cost per apprehension
for just border-control patrol activities is even less than the cost for over-all border patrol
activities. See D. North, Enforcing the Immigration Law: A Review of the Options 17 (Sept.
1980), reprinted in SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, 97TH CONG., lT
SEss., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST app. E (Comm. Print 1981).
North's study includes several ideas for increasing the efficiency of the enforcement of im-
migration law at the border and in the interior.
1982]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
(and workers with skills that are readily transferable internation-
ally) do not lose the value of their training in the United States.
Country-specific investment in training tends to rise with the skill
level. A deported skilled illegal alien finds that investments in
United States-specific training are not relevant when he returns to
his home country, and that some of the skills specific to the coun-
try of origin acquired prior to the illegal migration have subse-
quently depreciated.
The resources devoted to the enforcement of immigration are
relatively small and have not kept pace with the workload.42 The
number of permanent positions in the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service increased nearly sixty percent from 1960 to 1979.11
During the same period, the annual number of immigrants more
than doubled, nonimmigrant admission of aliens increased eight-
fold, and the number of apprehensions of illegal aliens increased
fourteenfold. Not all of the increase in permanent positions reflects
more resources devoted to direct enforcement activities, particu-
larly in recent years. For example, from fiscal year 1977 to 1979 the
INS operating budget increased eleven percent in real dollars, and
the real resources devoted to service to the public, support opera-
tions, and program direction increased forty-seven percent during
the same period. In contrast, border enforcement resources in-
creased one percent, detention and deportation resources de-
creased four percent, and interior enforcement resources decreased
fifteen percent." This reallocation of resources within the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service away from enforcement activi-
ties, particularly interior enforcement, reflected a decision by the
42. In addition to screening persons entering through legal gateways (a function shared
with the Customs Service), and other immigration law enforcement through patrols along
the border and interior enforcement, the 'INS administers exclusion and deportation pro-
ceedings. The State Department's Visa Service administers visa applications, and the Labor
Department's Office of Labor Certification issues labor certificates. North estimated that in
fiscal year 1980 there were 11,869 "immigration law enforcement positions." Of these, 8,433
were in the INS (including 2,694 in the border patrol and 1,019 in interior enforcement),
2,287 in the Customs Service, 907 in the State Department, and 242 in the Labor Depart-
ment's Employment Standards Administration (enforcement of minimum-wage and farm-
work regulations). Id. at 13.
43. See Table 4, supra p. 908. The INS publishes detailed tables, including tables that
chart immigrants, nonimmigrants, apprehensions, and naturalizations, in its annual reports
and in its 105-page 1978 Statistical Yearbook. But the annual reports, the 1978 Statistical
Yearbook, and the INS Reporter do not include data on the INS budget, number of person-
nel, or number of personnel in enforcement units. Apparently, the only published informa-
tion on these matters is included in the Appendix to the United States Budget.
44. The percentage increase in nominal expenditures was adjusted by the deflator for
federal nondefense purchases of goods and services, which increased 14% during the period.
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Carter administration to grant de facto amnesty for illegal aliens
already living in the United States. Congress showed no interest in
the administration's 1977 legislative proposal for amnesty.4
III. HETEROGENEITY AMONG IMMIGRANTS
The American public commonly views immigrants either as
unskilled and poorly motivated workers, or as highly successful
and aggressive achievers. These characterizations focus on the ex-
tremes. The average immigrant is at neither pole, but is apparently
closer to the latter than the former. More striking is the heteroge-
neity among immigrants. Immigrants differ almost as much as na-
tives in their earnings, occupational distribution, schooling, and
on-the-job training. They also vary widely in country of origin. Al-
though there is a tendency for most immigrants to be adults in
their twenties at the time they immigrate, this is more the case for
economic migrants than for refugees.
Analytically, the productivity of immigrants is considered
most fruitfully within the context of two models-the transferabil-
ity of skills and the self-selection of migrants. Immigrants from
English-speaking countries at a similar level of economic develop-
ment as the United States are more likely to have readily transfer-
able skills than are immigrants from other countries. This implies
that they have higher earnings at arrival, and experience a smaller
rise in earnings with duration of residence. Because of the greater
economic incentive for migration among the most able and ambi-
tious, if other factors are the same, immigrants, particularly eco-
nomic immigrants, tend to be favorably self-selected for labor mar-
ket success. Because labor market considerations are less relevant
in the decision to move among refugees and tied movers (those
who move primarily as a consequence of the immigration decision
of a family member) in comparison with economic migrants, the
latter would tend to have more readily transferable skills.
The productivity of immigrants, as measured by their labor
market earnings, varies systematically with several readily measur-
able variables. 46 For example, earnings are higher for immigrants
45. The Carter administration's proposed 1982 budget included a further decline in real
resources for the INS. "Mr. Crosland [Acting Commissioner] said that the new budget
would maintain the strength of the border patrol, but cut the number of investigators who
look for illegal aliens inside the country and trim the number of inspectors who screen trav-
elers at ports of entry." Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1981, at 4, col. 5.
46. See B. CHISWICK, AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND IMPACT OF IMMI-
GRANTS (report prepared for the Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Depart-
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with more schooling, whether the schooling was acquired in the
United States or in the country of origin. The effect of schooling
on earnings is greater for immigrants with highly transferable skills
(e.g., economic migrants from English-speaking countries), and is
least for refugees (e.g., Cubans). Earnings also are related posi-
tively to the number of years of labor-market experience in the
country of origin prior to immigration. Again, this effect is greater
for economic immigrants from English-speaking countries, and
least for refugees.
Most striking is the generally positive effect of duration of res-
idence in the United States on the earnings of immigrants. The
effect is curvilinear: earnings generally rise very sharply during the
first few years, and then continue to rise at a decreasing rate with
the duration of residence. The magnitude of the rise in earnings
with duration of residence is greater for those who must undergo
the greatest economic adjustment on arrival (refugees), and weak-
est for those with the smallest economic adjustment (English-
speaking economic migrants). Although on arrival male economic
migrants have lower earnings than their native-born counterparts,
if other factors are the same, economic migrants reach earnings
parity after eleven to fifteen years. Thereafter, the immigrants
have higher earnings.
Earnings also are related to the cause of the migration. Earn-
ings are greater for economic migrants than for political refugees,
presumably because noneconomic factors influence the migration
decision of the latter, and because refugees have fewer transferable
skills. Earnings -on arrival are very low for refugees (again, assum-
ing other variables are the same); although the gap narrows with a
longer residence, it does not close. The data also suggest that tied
movers, who base their decision to migrate primarily on the migra-
tion decision of a family member, have lower earnings than the pri-
mary economic migrant. The 1970 Census of Population evidenced
that, if other forces are the same, women who married prior to im-
migration consistently had lower hourly earnings than those who
married after immigration. 47 Tied movers had lower earnings and
higher unemployment rates at their destination than similarly situ-
ated internal migrants who were not tied movers. 8 It also has been
ment of Labor) (available from National Technical Information Service, NTIS No. PB 80-
200454) [hereinafter cited as B. CHISWICK, EcONOMIC PROGRESS]. The data are from the U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION.
47. See B. CHISWICK, ECONOMIC PROGRESS, supra note 46, at 182, 200.
48. Mincer, Family Migration Decisions, 86 J. POL. ECON. 749 (1978).
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found that, other things being equal after seven years in the
United States, persons admitted under the kinship immigration
criteria had lower earnings than occupational-preference and non-
preference immigrants. 9 The superior performance of primary eco-
nomic migrants in comparison with, those whose migration is influ-
enced by kinship ties, even when other measured variables are the
same, is presumably related to the transferability of skill, ability,
motivation for personal labor-market advancement, and continuity
of attachment to the labor market.
There is a substantial difference in earnings between immi-
grants from advanced industrialized societies and those from less
developed countries. This difference is partly attributable to the
latter's fewer years of formal schooling. Even so, some substantial
and significant differences remain. For example, when other factors
remain constant, including area of residence in the United States
and marital status, immigrants from Mexico earn about twenty
percent less than European immigrants. Perhaps this arises be-
cause the earnings gain from migration from Mexico is so substan-
tial that it is worthwhile, even if earnings are lower than average in
the United States. But immigration from the higher-income coun-
tries is profitable only if higher than average earnings can be ob-
tained in the United States.5
IV. ECONOMIC IMPACT
The formation of immigration policy, as with other types of
public policy, would be simpler if the native population were ho-
mogeneous. Then the average impact of immigrants on the native
population would be the impact on each and every native person.
However, natives are heterogeneous in both their human and non-
human assets. Consequently, in policy debates the distribution of
the impact can be as important as, if not more important than, the
overall impact.
A. Unemployment Myths and Realities
Much of the public debate regarding immigrants is expressed
49. See D. NORTH, SEVEN YEARS LATER: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 1970 COHORT OF IMMI-
GRANTS IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET 102-04 (report prepared for the Employment and Train-
ing Administration, U.S. Department of Labor).
50. For reasons that remain unclear, if other variables are constant, the earnings differ-
ential of about 20% between Mexican-Americans and Anglos also exists among second gen-
eration Americans (native-born but with at least one foreign-born parent) and higher-gener-
ation Americans (both parents born in the United States).
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in terms of unemployment. Recently, there has been bipartisan po-
litical support for the immigrant-unemployment connection: Both
the Secretary of Labor in the Carter administration and the Com-
missioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the
Ford administration attributed the unemployment of at least two
to three million Americans to illegal aliens. 5' The economic fear is
that immigrants take jobs that natives would otherwise have,
thereby contributing to unemployment.
It is important to distinguish between taking a particular job
"slot," and depriving a native worker of a job. For example, if an
immigrant takes a particular job washing dishes in a restaurant,
then that job slot clearly has not been filled by a native-born
worker. This visible effect generates resentment. It is, however, the
availability of jobs that attracts workers into the U.S. labor mar-
ket, both from the household sector (outside the labor force) and
from other countries. The absolute growth in employment in the
United States consistently has exceeded the growth in the numbers
unemployed. There is no fixed number of jobs in the economy; the
extent of employment generally increases with increased immigra-
tion, although relative wages may change.
Suppose an immigrant takes a job that otherwise would have
been occupied by a native worker. The immigrant either may
hoard his earnings, spend all of his earnings, or do something in
between. If the immigrant hoards his earnings, the natives gain the
benefit of his production, giving nothing in return but green pieces
of paper that are inexpensive to produce. The effect is deflation-
ary-it is as if the Federal Reserve System reduced the money sup-
ply by the amount hoarded.2 Natives as a whole would have
greater income. Native workers would allocate themselves among
jobs in the labor market, and the rate of increase in the price level
would be lower than otherwise. As long as there is some flexibility
in wages, and workers can change jobs, no permanent unemploy-
ment is created.
More likely, the immigrant spends his earnings either in the
United States or by emigrant remittances to his home country.
51. See Illegal Aliens Take Jobs of Citizens, Marshall Declares, L.A. Times, Dec. 2,
1979, § 1, at 1, col. 2; Chapman, "Silent Invasion" that Takes Millions of American Jobs,
U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 9, 1974, at 77-78. This view is not confined to the United
States. "One and a half million unemployed is one and half million immigrants too many,"
is also the slogan of anti-immigrant elements in France. French Directing Anger at Immi-
grant Workers, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1980, at A3, col. 5.
52. The deflationary effect, of course, could be offset by appropriate adjustments in
monetary policy.
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There is no deflationary effect, as the extra output produced by
the immigrant is matched by the increase in the aggregate demand
for goods and services. Employment is generated as workers pro-
duce the goods and services purchased by the immigrants.
In either instance, immigration per se does not result in a per-
manent net loss in jobs to natives, even if immigrants take particu-
lar job slots that native workers otherwise would occupy. There
are, however, three circumstances in which immigration could re-
sult in increased measured unemployment, although they are not
what proponents of the immigrant-unemployment connection ap-
pear to be discussing: (1) the unemployment of immigrants per se;
(2) frictional unemployment among the native population; and (3)
structural unemployment arising from wage rigidities.
Recent entrants to the labor force-whether they are youths
leaving school, women entering or reentering the labor market, or
new immigrants-engage in a job search. It takes time to find a
job, and one way of learning about occupations and employers is to
experience a variety of jobs. Higher than average voluntary job
turnover is therefore a characteristic of recent labor force entrants.
Recent immigrants, in particular, experience substantial upward
occupational mobility, presumably often accompanied by periods
of voluntary unemployment as their skills adjust to the American
labor market. Recent labor-market entrants may also experience
greater involuntary separations from employment since their em-
ployers had less information about them when they were hired and
the workers have less seniority. Moreover, their employers have
made smaller investments in their firm-specific training.
Data from the 1970 Census and the 1976 Survey of Income
and Education (SIE) suggest that, other factors being equal, the
number of weeks worked by adult white men in a year was lower
among recent immigrants than among the native-born and long-
term immigrants." In the 1970 Census, which recorded year of im-
migration in five-year intervals, the foreign-born in the United
States for less than five years worked three weeks less than the
native-born. Immigrants in the United States five to nine years
worked one week less. For immigrants in the United States for ten
or more years, there was no difference from the native-born.
Among the foreign-born, those in the United States for less than
five years worked about three weeks fewer than others, with no
53. The empirical analyses reported in this paragraph and the next are based on B.
CHISWICK, THE EMPLOYMENT OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1982).
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significant differences among the six cohorts identified in the data
who were in the United States for five or more years. Although the
sample sizes in the 1976 SIE are smaller than in the one-in-a-hun-
dred sample from the 1970 Census, the greater detail on specific
year of immigration for those in the United States for five or fewer
years is illuminating. The SIE data suggest that most of the
smaller number of weeks worked among those in the United States
for five or fewer years is concentrated among the very recent arriv-
als; the difference in weeks worked narrows rapidly, virtually dis-
appearing by the end of three to five years.
As is true among the native-born, the number of weeks worked
is greater the higher the level of schooling and the greater the ex-
tent of labor-market experience (both before and after immigra-
tion) for the foreign-born. The number of weeks worked is also
greater for those whose skills are more readily transferable to the
U.S. labor-market. Other things being equal, immigrants from
Cuba, Southern Europe, and the Balkans worked one week less
than immigrants from the British Isles, while immigrants from
Mexico worked two weeks less, and those from other Latin Ameri-
can countries worked 1.5 weeks less.
An influx of workers due to immigration will generate fric-
tional unemployment among native-born workers. Frictional un-
employment will arise whenever there is a change in the demand
for or supply of labor that affects relative wage opportunities.
Some workers will quit their current jobs in search of new higher-
paying jobs. Employers in sectors where workers' marginal produc-
tivity has fallen below their wages will lay off some workers. Given
the change in labor market opportunities, both workers and em-
ployers invest more in information regarding the labor market, re-
sulting in frictional unemployment. Given the immigration, the
frictional unemployment represents an efficient process through
which workers identify and gravitate to what is currently their best
employment opportunity, and through which employers adjust
their work force to the new economic conditions.
Only a small proportion of native-born workers will experience
frictional unemployment arising from immigration. Additionally,
this unemployment will be short-lived; it will dampen as workers
find their best employment opportunities in the new environment.
The extent of frictional unemployment will be less the greater the
extent to which immigrants are attracted to the United States and
particular occupations or geographic areas by expanding job oppor-
tunities. Frictional unemployment will be greater if immigrants are
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entering stagnant occupations or economically stagnant regions.
Thus, for a given size of a cohort of immigrants, frictional unem-
ployment among the native population will tend to be smaller if
the immigration is predominantly economic in nature rather than
based on kinship or other criteria.
Wage rigidities, whether instituted by a legal minimum wage,
a union wage, or social convention, can result in unemployment
among the native-born if immigration would depress the market
wage below the wage floor. 4 If the wage floor exceeds the market
wage, more workers will offer their labor services than there are job
slots. One solution is, of course, to eliminate the wage floor. A "sec-
ond best" solution is to implement an immigration policy that
would favor the immigration of high-skilled workers. This would
cause the productivity of low-skilled native workers to rise and
would reduce the pressures against the federal minimum wage. Al-
though this policy would have particularly favorable impacts on
the employment opportunities of native-born youths and disadvan-
taged minorities, it would also place downward pressure on the
wages of the high-skilled workers.
B. Impact on Income
For simplicity of exposition regarding the impact of immi-
grants on the level and distribution of income, assume that there
are two types of workers, low-skilled and high-skilled, that within
each type all workers are homogeneous, and that the only other
factor of production is physical capital.5 5 Assume also that the
three factors of production are substitutes for each other, and that
the production function approximates one with constant elasticity
of substitution. Even in such a simplified situation, the impact of
immigration is difficult to determine because of the potential for
immigrant cohorts with quite different productivity characteristics.
Although partially determined by external forces-such as a reces-
54. Some of the high unemployment or low number of weeks worked among immigrants
during their first few years may be a consequence of such wage rigidities. On arrival, immi-
grants tend to be relatively unproductive. But with the passage of time, and the increase in
job experience, immigrants acquire skills that will help them obtain higher-paying jobs in
the United States. By reducing the option of working in very low wage jobs that provide
substantial training, the minimum wage may be impeding the upward economic mobility of
immigrants.
55. The discussion in this section is based on a theoretical analysis developed in detail
in Chiswick, The Impact of Immigration on the Level and Distribution of Economic Well-
Being, in THE GATEWAY: U.S. IMMIGRATION ISSUES AND POLICIES (B. Chiswick ed. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Chiswick, Immigration Impact].
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sion in one country or a revolution in another-under current cir-
cumstances and immigration quota ceilings, the characteristics of
immigrant cohorts are largely determined by the United States im-
migration policy over a period of years.
Again, for purposes of exposition, consider the implications of
two polar cases: a cohort of low-skilled workers and a cohort of
high-skilled workers. The immigration of low-skilled workers
reduces the marginal product of low-skilled native workers, but
raises the marginal product of high-skilled workers and capital.
The former effect arises from the greater labor supply of low-
skilled workers, who are good substitutes in production for native
low-skilled workers. The latter arises from the principle of comple-
mentarity-that the marginal product of a factor increases when
the quantity of other factors of production with which it works in-
creases. Although one native factor loses and the other native fac-
tors gain, the overall income of the native population increases.
This is because the losses to native low-skilled labor are more than
offset by the gains to native high-skilled labor and capital. Thus,
average income among the native population increases, but the dis-
tribution of this income becomes more unequal.
The increase in the average income of the native population
contrasts with the decline in the average income of the total popu-
lation (natives augmented by immigrants). This decline arises from
the assumption that low-skilled immigrants have lower incomes
than the native population's average income. Thus, if the native
population's average income is a variable of primary interest for
determining the appropriate immigration policy, changes in the to-
tal population's average income may be a misleading indicator.
The decline in the earnings of low-skilled native workers as a
result of low-skilled immigration is partially mitigated by the in-
come tax and the mix of income transfers. Many of the recipients
of income-contingent transfers, particularly recipients of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, and Supple-
mental Security Income (SSI), and most of the aged recipients of
Social Security and Medicare have little or no attachment to the
labor market and hence do not suffer a direct adverse impact.
Those who do suffer a direct impact-the working poor-may be
eligible for food stamps, and, in the case of single-parent families,
AFDC. If they become unemployed, the poor may be eligible for
state unemployment compensation and AFDC-UP (Unemployed
Parents' component of AFDC). Because the native population's ag-
gregate income has increased, at least in principle, sufficient in-
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come can be transferred from the gainers (high-skilled workers and
owners of capital) to the losers (native low-skilled workers), so that
all groups among the native population are at least as well off as
before the immigration.
A dilemma arises, however, because by tradition as well as by
law, legal immigrants (resident aliens) are eligible for the same in-
come-transfer benefits as similarly situated natives.5 6 The theoreti-
cal model indicates that if the low-skilled immigrants are to receive
transfers that bring their incomes up to the pre-immigration in-
come of native low-skilled workers, then the aggregate transfers
will exceed the increase in income of high-skilled workers and capi-
tal. Thus, the native population as a whole can be made worse off.
With the immigration of a cohort of high-skilled workers, the
wages of native high-skilled workers decline, while the wages of na-
tive low-skilled workers and the returns to capital, increase. The
aggregate income, and hence the native population's average in-
come, increases. The change in the total population's average in-
come cannot be determined, however, without knowing whether
the average income of the high-skilled immigrants is higher or
lower than the income (earnings and return to capital) of the na-
tive population. The narrowing of skill differentials would appeal
to those who dislike inequality in labor-market outcomes.
The rise in the wages of native low-skilled workers increases
their tax payments and lowers their receipt of income-contingent
transfers. Because of these resources, as well as the higher taxes
paid by capital and the positive taxes paid by high-skilled immi-
grants, the marginal tax rates on the earnings of native high-skilled
workers can be lowered. Thus, net of the tax-transfer system, high-
skilled workers can be made at least as well off as before the immi-
gration, without eliminating all of the gains of native low-skilled
workers and capital. With high-skilled immigrants, equal treat-
ment of immigrants and natives can be maintained in the income-
transfer system, and all native groups can be made at least as well-
off as before the immigration.
Recent empirical research has examined the relation between
the characteristics of immigrants and the earnings of the native-
born.5 7 The analysis has been done for adult white non-Hispanic
56. The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. V 1981), limits an immigrant's
receipt of Supplemental Security Income benefits during the first three years in the United
States, unless an unanticipated disability arises after immigration. SSI provides cash bene-
fits for low-income aged and disabled persons.
57. B. Chiswick, The Effects of Immigration on Earnings and Employment in the
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native-born men, using the 1970 Census. Holding constant the na-
tive-born person's human capital and demographic characteristics,
weekly earnings among the native-born rise with an increase in the
level of the foreign-born's schooling and labor-market experience.
In addition, using immigrants from the English-speaking devel-
oped countries as a benchmark, earnings among the native-born
rise with an increase in the proportion of immigrants from Europe
and a decrease in the proportion from Cuba and other less-devel-
oped countries, while there is no differential effect for the propor-
tion from Mexico. Thus, more highly skilled or more productive
immigrants are associated with greater earnings among the native-
born.
An often-expressed concern is that immigrants can take ad-
vantage of society's investment in public capital. By using roads,
schools, dams, and parks that have been constructed before their
immigration, immigrants "dilute" the public capital available to
the native population, thereby decreasing the native population's
income. Highly skilled immigrants would be substantial benefi-
ciaries of income transfers broadly defined to include the consump-
tion of public capital. 8 This point, however, confuses the timing of
the construction of public capital with the financing of this capital.
The construction of most public capital is financed not from cur-
rent tax receipts, but rather from bonds that are retired with reve-
nues raised from user-fees or taxes as the capital is consumed. To
the extent that the public capital is paid for as it is consumed,
immigrants do not gain, and there is no dilution of the natives'
public capital even if it is constructed prior to the immigration.
V. ALTERNATIVE IMMIGRATION POLICIES
The review of current United States policy has shown that
kinship is the primary criterion for rationing immigration visas,
and that the visa applicant's skills or productivity characteristics
play a relatively minor role. There is a considerable difference be-
tween the skill levels and earnings of immigrants admitted under
the kinship criteria and under the productivity criteria. More
favorable impacts on the level and distribution of the native popu-
lation's income arise from higher-skilled immigrants than from
United States, Part B, (1981) (available at University of Illinois at Chicago, Survey Re-
search Laboratory).
58. This is one of the arguments discussed in Usher, Public Property and the Effects of
Migration upon Other Residents of the Migrants' Countries of Origin and Destination, 85
J. POL. EcoN. 1001 (1977).
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lower-skilled immigrants.
This section reviews two very different approaches to the re-
form of immigration policy." The first is a skill-based rationing
system in which an applicant's skill level, and hence the likelihood
of his economic success in the United States, are the primary de-
terminants of whether a visa is issued. 0 A point system is pro-
posed for administering the program. The second approach is the
set of recommendations from the Select Commission on Immigra-
tion and Refugee Policy 1 for modifications of the current system.
The Commission's recommendations apparently would: (1) reduce
the already small role of productivity characteristics in issuing im-
migration visas, (2) grant amnesty for illegal aliens, and (3) in-
crease the relative and absolute number of low-skilled workers in
future cohorts of immigrants.
A. A Skill-Based Rationing System
The current immigration policy could be shifted radically by
focusing on productivity characteristics instead of kinship criteria.
Under a productivity or skill-based policy, the primary criterion
for rationing admissions would be the person's estimated produc-
tivity in the United States.2 Research indicates that an immi-
grant's productivity, as measured by earnings and employment, ap-
pears to be related to the level and transferability of pre-
immigration skills, including the level of schooling, vocational and
on-the-job training, occupation, and knowledge of English. Prear-
ranged employment also may be an aid to increased productivity.
In a productivity-based immigration policy, there is a tempta-
tion to grant visas to applicants in narrowly defined occupations in
which there are "shortages," and to deny visas to applicants in
"crowded" occupations. Indeed, in the occupational preferences of
current immigration law, this approach has been adopted with ab-
surd consequences. Physicians, nurses, physical therapists,
dieticians, and others, are added to or withdrawn from the list of
59. Policies regarding refugees and temporary (guest) workers are beyond the scope of
this section.
60. For a detailed analysis of this approach, see P. CAFFERTY, B. CHISWlCK, A. GREELEY
& T. SULLIVAN, THE DILEMMA OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION: BEYOND THE GOLDEN DOOR (in
press).
61. The Commission was established by the Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, § 4,
92 Stat. 907-09 (1978), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-132, § 23, 93 Stat. 1051-52 (1979).
62. Productivity or skill characteristics and a point system form the basis for rationing
visas in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
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the most favored (Schedule A) occupations on the basis of political
pressures of interested parties rather than on labor market stud-
ies."' Studies are not done to determine whether other occupations,
such as engineering, are in equally "short supply." The economic
aspects of the issues, including the subsequent occupational ad-
justments of the immigrants and the change in the occupational
structure of the native-born labor force as a consequence of immi-
gration, appear to play no role in the rulemaking process.
The granting of visas on the basis of narrowly defined occupa-
tions invites efforts to subvert the system. If the occupational cate-
gories are defined more broadly, however, then the adverse impact
from a cohort of immigrants will be more diffused. This might help
to avoid the manipulation of a skill-based rationing system by nar-
row occupational interests. Also, there will be less incentive for any
one occupation to attempt to close their occupational category.
It is difficult for planners to know where there will be labor
"shortages" and where there will be labor "surpluses" in the com-
ing years. Occupational adjustments occur not only through the
immigration of persons in the occupation but also through the sub-
stantial occupational change of immigrants after they arrive in the
United States, and through the occupational change of natives.
The focus in a skill-based rationing system should be on an appli-
cant's skill level, rather than on his narrowly defined occupation.
To combine the multidimensional aspects of skills into ration-
ing criteria, it may be necessary to adopt a point system rather
than a preference system. In a preference system, as formulated
under current law, a person must meet a minimum standard under
any one of several categories to be eligible for a visa. 4 There is no
possibility for combining equities under each of two or more cate-
gories to raise one's rank in the queue. But under a point system, it
is the sum of the points obtained from several categories that is
relevant, rather than crossing a threshold in any one category.
Under a point system, points could be earned for various pro-
ductivity traits, and a visa would be issued to persons who received
a minimum number of points." Each year of schooling may be
worth, for example, two points. Apprenticeship, vocational train-
63. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 10.
65. Persons exempt from the point system would be the immediate relatives (spouse
and minor children) of U.S. citizens, refugees and their immediate relatives, and the imme-
diate relatives of persons given an immigrant visa if they accompany the immigrant or come
within a certain time (perhaps one year).
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ing, and on-the-job training also would be worth a certain number
of points. Points could be earned, possibly on a scale of zero to
five, for fluency in English. Other points could be awarded for pre-
arranged employment. To preserve the nonracist character of im-
migration policy, points should not be granted on the basis of race,
ethnicity, religion, or country of origin."
Evaluating skills and awarding points should be the responsi-
bility of a single agency-the Immigration Service. To have this
function performed in either the Department of Labor or the De-
partment of Commerce would be to invite efforts by interest
groups entrenched in either agency to subvert the system for their
own purposes. As an independent agency, the Immigration Service
would be subject to influences from many sources, and thus might
be better able to steer a middle course.
6
7
To reduce variations in the annual number of immigrants, a
worldwide annual quota could be retained, with visas issued to
those with the largest number of points among those who satisfy
the threshold. To reduce the uncertainty concerning when permis-
sion to immigrate will be granted among those in the queue, addi-
tional points (that do not count toward the minimum threshold)
might be given for waiting in the queue. Of course, if the queue
gets too long, either the minimum threshold number or the annual
quota should be increased.
The point system can be flexible to provide greater immigra-
tion opportunities for persons with relatives in the United States.
This should be done without violating the rationing system's con-
66. Canada uses a point system similar to the one suggested here for persons who are
not the immediate relatives of citizens. In addition to the criteria indicated in this section,
Canada gives points for the intention to settle in a geographic area that the Canadian gov-
ernment wishes to populate. The policy is of limited effectiveness because internal geo-
graphic mobility after immigration is not restricted. Because specific residential location
would not be enforceable in the United States, and because the United States does not have
a clearly defined regional policy, this would appear to be an inappropriate criterion for U.S.
policy. Indeed, efforts by the federal government to disperse the Indochinese refugees geo-
graphically have been ineffective. There has been substantial internal migration from the
community of first settlement to California, their preferred state of residence. See Gordon,
Settlement Patterns of Indochinese Refugees in the United States, I.N.S. REP., Spring
1980, at 6-10.
67. There is no compelling reason for immigration matters to be part of the Depart-
ment of Justice. The immigration and naturalization functions are separable, and the latter
only may be an appropriate function for the Department. As an independent agency, the
new Immigration Service would be less constrained by Justice Department interests in mak-
ing its case for more resources for enforcement, and would be in a better position to insti-
tute regulations and recommend policy changes based on overall economic considerations.
The agency shall not have cabinet status.
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cern for the economic impact of immigrants. A small number of
points may be awarded, for example, to applicants with relatives in
the United States who will guarantee their financial support for a
certain length of time. In this manner, persons who do not satisfy
the general productivity criterion, but whose presence is of "con-
sumption value" to their relatives in this country, would be more
able to immigrate legally.
History provides some examples of what the proposed immi-
gration policy's effect would be on the occupational distribution of
immigrants. In 1962 Canada shifted from a kinship-based immi-
gration policy, not unlike current United States policy, to a system
with kinship criteria for immediate relatives of Canadians and a
primarily skill-based point system for others. The proportion of
professional and technical workers among the immigrants in-
creased from an annual average of twelve percent in 1956-1960 to
an annual average of twenty-six percent in 1962-1971. The annual
average proportion of unskilled workers declined from thirty-six
percent in 1956-1960 to sixteen percent in 1962-1971.1
8
Some may argue that the productivity criterion outlined above
is antifamily-that such a dramatic change from the current sys-
tem would end the humanitarian goal of family reunification. This
is not so. Foreigners with more kinsmen in the United States
would still be more likely to apply for an immigrant visa, because
immigrating to the United States is more attractive to them than
to others in their home country. Additionally, the immediate rela-
tives of United States citizens would still be eligible for admission
without numerical restrictions. For other applicants, those who
have sufficient points to immigrate could do so, and could be "re-
united" with family members. A person with kinsmen in the
United States would have two advantages: his relatives could help
him prearrange employment, and they could guarantee his
financial support for the first five years. Willingness to engage in
these activities is one test of the relative's interest in his kinsmen's
immigration.6
Many aliens can immigrate under the current kinship criteria
but not under the productivity criteria. Their immigration is at the
expense of the native population, since the United States will be
68. Parai, Canada's Immigration Policy, 1962-74, 9 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 449, 469-72
(1975).
69. Voluntary family dislocations that arise from economic migration are a less compel-
ling reason for special "family reunification" visas than are the involuntary separations and
dislocations often arising from situations that create refugees.
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accepting a less productive worker instead of a more productive
worker. The largest adverse impact under the current system is ex-
perienced by native-born low-skilled workers. These workers face
greater competition in the labor market and in the allocation of
income-contingent transfers from a larger number of low-skilled
immigrants. The current system provides the largest benefits to
the relatives of immigrants entering under kinship criteria, many
of whom are themselves recent citizens and resident aliens. This
inequity would be removed under the productivity criteria.
The political support for admitting a larger number of immi-
grants each year would be more broadly based under a skill-based
rationing system than under the current kinship system. This is
because of the more favorable impact of immigration on both the
level and distribution of income. The extent to which the optimal
number of immigrants would increase as a consequence of the
change in criteria is an empirical question that warrants further
study.
B. The SCIRP Recommendations
The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy
(SCIRP), created by an act of Congress in 1978,70 released its rec-
ommendations in February 1981.71 The Commission's recommen-
dations focused on a modification of the preference system for le-
gal immigrants, amnesty for illegal aliens in the United States, and
policies to control future illegal immigration. The apparent thrust
of the Commission's recommendations is to: (1) increase the role of
kinship, (2) decrease the already small role of skill or productivity
in rationing immigration visas, (3) increase immigration of low-
productivity workers, and (4) shift much of the burden of the en-
forcement of immigration law onto employers through a require-
ment that they screen all workers for their legal status.
SCIRP recommended retaining the current policy of allowing
immigration without numerical limit for the spouses, minor un-
married children, and parents of adult citizens. It also recom-
mended adding adult unmarried children (currently the first pref-
erence) and grandparents of adult citizens to the exempt list.
Under current regulations, there is little binding constraint on
70. Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, § 4, 92 Stat. 907-09 (1978), amended by
Pub. L. No. 96-132, § 23, 93 Stat. 1051-52 (1979).
71. SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as
SCIRP].
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first-preference visa applicants from most countries, with the ex-
ception of Mexico.
7 2
The Commission endorsed a worldwide numerical limit and
country quotas for other relatives and "independent immigrants."
The recommended worldwide limit is 350,000 visas per year, with
an additional 100,000 visas per year for five years to reduce the
visa backlog.78 The categories for other relatives would include the
current second, fourth, and fifth preferences. A new category, the
unmarried adult children of resident aliens, would also be in-
cluded. The Commission further recommended that a "substan-
tial" number of visas be set aside for the spouses and unmarried
children of resident aliens, that there be no country ceilings for the
spouses and minor children of resident aliens, 4 and that these
visas be issued on a first-come, first-served basis. The second-pref-
erence country ceiling is severely binding only for Mexico and the
Philippines. As of February 1983, second-preference applications
by Mexican nationals filed in February 1974 were at the top of the
queue.7 5 The recommendations regarding the current second pref-
erence are related to the Commission's proposal of amnesty.
SCIRP views the independent immigrant category, which
would replace current occupational and nonpreference categories,
as a means of creating new kinship immigration streams ("new
seed" immigrants), rather than as a mechanism for selecting work-
ers with the greatest productivity in the United States. 76 The inde-
pendent category includes a numerically limited number of persons
72. As of January 1, 1980, Mexican nationals totaled 38% of the first preference visa
backlog. Id. at 146.
73. Id. at 149. As of January 1, 1980, there was a backlog of 1.1 million visa applica-
tions, an increase of 100,000 over the previous year. Id. at 146. The Commissioners called for
reducing the visa backlog as quickly as possible. Although no formal vote was taken, the
report notes that "many Commissioners are of the view that per-country and preference
ceilings-although applied to new applicants under the proposed system-should not apply
to those in the backlogs." Id. at 150. Much of the backlog is concentrated in a small number
of countries, including Mexico (25%), the Philippines (23%), and Korea (7%). The backlog
exists primarily in the kinship preferences and nonpreference categories (5% in the second
preference, 50% in the fifth preference and 26% in the nonpreference category), with only
7% in the occupational preferences. Id. at 146.
74. Id. at 148.
75. 5 Bureau of Consular Affairs, Visa Office, U.S. Dep't of State, Immigrant Numbers
for February 1983 (No. 33, 1983).
76. "It is the Commission's hope that this category will provide immigration opportuni-
ties for those persons who come from countries where immigration to the United States has
not been recent or from countries that have no immigration base here." SCIRP, supra note
72, at 16.
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with "exceptional merit and ability in their professions."77 None-
theless, the Commission also stated,
The Commission's intent is not to provide a separate category
for highly trained or needed professionals (for example, nurses,
doctors, engineers), artists or other persons of merit unless they
are exceptional and qualify under specific established guide-
lines. .... [T]he Commission further cautions against the crea-
tion of a significant channel which could deprive other nations
of the highly skilled persons they need.
78
A presumably larger category of other independent migrants is also
proposed, to "allow the entry of persons without family ties in the
United States and of persons whose family ties are distant ...
One possible benefit will be the increased proportion of immi-
grants screened for labor market impact; this will both protect U.S.
workers and enhance economic growth. 7 9
SCIRP recommended amnesty for illegal aliens in the United
States as of January 1, 1980.80 Once given an adjustment of status,
these persons could serve as sponsors for their relatives. Amnesty
would increase the number of low-skilled workers in the United
States in three ways. First, the prospect of amnesty would en-
courage the illegal immigration of other low-skilled workers with
the expectation that, once granted, amnesty would be offered re-
peatedly. Indeed, illegal immigration increased sharply when Presi-
dent Carter made his proposal for amnesty in 1977. Second, am-
nesty would increase substantially the demand for immigration
visas by the spouses and children of those given amnesty, and
many of these soon would enter the labor market. The recommen-
dations mentioned above for more favorable treatment of this cate-
gory of immigrant, especially for Mexican nationals, would allow
the system to satisfy much of this increased demand for visas.
Third, many illegal aliens who return home during periods of sea-
sonal and cyclical slack in employment would remain in the United
States, as their families would be with them and they would be
77. Id. at 130.
78. Id. The Commission's view regarding the immigration of professionals is exempli-
fied by its statement on nurses:
The Commission concludes that the continuing shortage of practicing nurses in
the United States justifies the admission of foreign nurses while that shortage
continues, but urges that efforts be intensified to make nursing a more attractive
career to induce more inactive U.S. nurses to return to that profession.
Id. at 223.
79. Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 76-77.
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able to receive income transfers legally.
SCIRP proposes to control future illegal immigration through
increased resources for border enforcement, and through employer
sanctions."' The Commission favors border enforcement more than
interior enforcement by the immigration authorities: "It is both
more humane and cost effective to deter people from entering the
United States than it is to locate and remove them from the inte-
rior."82 Border enforcement may be more cost effective per appre-
hension, but it is not necessarily more cost effective per deterred
alien. A recommendation is made for a "substantial increase" in
funding and personnel for the border patrol,8" but no parallel rec-
ommendation exists for interior enforcement. There are no recom-
mendations for penalties, other than deportation, against appre-
hended illegal aliens, even for those who engage in flagrant and
frequent violations of the law. SCIRP also endorsed the Attorney
General's ruling that "state and local law enforcement officers
should be prohibited from apprehending persons on immigration
charges, except in alien-smuggling cases."'" This ruling limits the
effectiveness of interior enforcement.
In spite of this hands-off policy for official law enforcement
agents, the Commission has endorsed civil penalties against em-
ployers who knowingly employ illegal aliens, and criminal penalties
against employers who engage in "flagrant and extended violations
of the law following the imposition of civil penalties."83 The Com-
mission was vague about the mechanism through which employers
could verify a worker's legal status, stating simply that it "sup-
port[s] a means of verifying employee eligibility that will allow em-
ployers to confidently and easily hire those persons who may le-
gally accept employment."86 The report does not indicate the
magnitude of these costs of employee verification, their effects on
the employment opportunities of high-turnover, low-skilled Ameri-
can workers, or whether such verification is feasible without a na-
tional identity card. Employer sanctions are not likely to reduce
employment opportunities for illegal aliens without both a reason-
ably foolproof means of checking a person's legal right to work,
and vigorous internal enforcement.
81. Id. at 46-52.
82. Id. at 47.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 256.
85. Id. at 64.
86. Id. at 67.
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Although there is much public concern about the use of wel-
fare and subsidized medical care by illegal aliens, the Commission
did not offer any recommendations on this issue. It did not, for
example, endorse or even vote on proposals that have been made
to alter current regulations of the Department of Health and
Human Services that bar welfare and other public aid agencies
from reporting suspected illegal aliens to the immigration authori-
ties. Indeed, it is curious that SCIRP endorsed extending the bur-
den of enforcement to employers, while favoring the current re-
strictions on referrals by state and local law enforcement
authorities and welfare agencies.
The overall thrust of SCIRP's policy recommendations is to
increase both the number and proportion of low-skilled immigrants
while decreasing the number of high-skilled immigrants. This em-
phasis presumably arises from the Commission's concern for
"global inequities, ' '87 and what appears to be a desire to increase
substantially immigration from Mexico. In nearly every instance,
recommended modifications of current policy would favor Mexican
immigrants over immigrants from other countries. These policies
would deprive the United States of many highly productive foreign
workers, depress the earnings of low-skilled American workers, and
result in increased taxes to pay for an expanded income-transfer
system. The economic impacts of SCIRP's recommendations ap-
pear to have been of minor concern to the Commission.88
VI. CONCLUSION
Immigration will continue to play an important role in Ameri-
can economic life. The public policy issue is not simply whether
immigration per se is beneficial, but rather whether increased ben-
efits to the United States can be obtained from changes in the
number of immigrants and the rationing criteria. In an era such as
the nineteenth century when public policy showed little regard for
the income-distribution impacts of immigration, and when there
were no public income-transfer systems to mitigate the losses to
groups for whom the impact was adverse, an open-door or laissez-
faire immigration policy was politically acceptable. These condi-
tions no longer prevail, and an open-door immigration policy is not
87. Id. at 20.
88. This perhaps was foreshadowed by the Commission's research agenda, which virtu-
ally ignored research on illegal aliens and the labor market impact of immigrants. See id. at
436-37.
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politically viable. If there are to be limits on immigration, then
there must be a rationing mechanism. A mechanism that would
provide more rapid growth in the income of the native population
and a relatively smaller transfer system is generally preferable to
one that offers opposite effects.
Current immigration policy is characterized by a rationing sys-
tem based on kinship and by lax enforcement of immigration law.
This policy has encouraged larger numbers of low-skilled immi-
grants to arrive in the United States than would have been here
had the rationing criteria focused on the level of skill. SCIRP ap-
parently would increase further the role of kinship, and decrease
the already small role of the productivity characteristics or skills of
the visa applicants. Rather than endorsing a major strengthening
of the enforcement of current immigration law, the Select Commis-
sion proposes legalizing the status of illegal aliens in the United
States, and shifting much of the enforcement responsibilities to
employers through sanctions against those who employ illegal
aliens. The Commissioners equivocated, however, on the crucial is-
sue of how employer sanctions were to be administered. Also, they
did not address the adverse impact of the additional cost of em-
ployer screening of workers upon employment opportunities for
native workers in low-wage, high-turnover jobs.
As an alternative, a two-pronged policy approach could be
adopted. One prong would be the more stringent enforcement of
current immigration law-not only at the border, but also in the
interior. Under this approach,*there would be no blanket amnesty
for illegal aliens, and the responsibility for enforcing immigration
law would not be shifted to employers. The second prong would
involve shifting the focus in rationing visas from kinship to the ap-
plicant's level of skill. As skill is not unidimensional, a point sys-
tem should be adopted to combine the diverse elements into a sin-
gle number. With the exception of the immediate relatives of adult
U.S. citizens, whose entry would not be subject to numerical limi-
tations, visas would be issued to those with the greatest number of
points, i.e., to those with the greatest potential productivity in the
United States. Points also could be given for less immediate kin-
ship relationships, but this should not be allowed to overwhelm the
productivity criteria. These proposals would better satisfy the twin
objectives of increasing the productive potential of the economy
and reducing the relative size of the income transfer system than
would either the current system or the Select Commission's
recommendations.
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